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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long recognized the devastating impact
that removal proceedings may have on the lives of aliens facing
deportation from the United States,' calling deportation "a drastic
measure [which is] at times the equivalent of banishment or ex-
ile."2 Unfortunately, the fear and anxiety that typically accompa-
nies removal proceedings is compounded by the complexity of im-
migration law and, specifically, the deportation process itself.' As
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has observed, "[with
only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been
termed 'second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity."
Accordingly, the presence of counsel has become essential to en-
suring that aliens understand the nature of the proceedings in
which they are participating, as well as their rights and responsi-
bilities.' In a number of cases, courts have even considered the
presence of counsel the decisive factor in preventing injustice.6
Simply put, navigating the labyrinth that is the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the "INA") requires the aid of a lawyer.
Be that as it may, it is equally as clear that individuals do not
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in removal proceedings,
as they are considered "civil" in nature.' "But where the courts
declined to see a constitutional remedy, Congress saw a dictate of
1. See Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) (explaining that
"deportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families"); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (describing deportation as a "penalty"
and a "punishment").
2. Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964) (quoting
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)).
3. See Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 414 (2000) (describing the com-
plexities of immigration proceedings).
4. Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312
(9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
5. Id.
6. Id. ("Over fifty years ago it was observed that in many cases a lawyer acting for an
alien would prevent a deportation which would have been an injustice but which the alien
herself would have been powerless to stop.") (Internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 459 F. App'x 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[Tlhe Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel does not apply in administrative removal proceedings. . . .");
United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[T]here is no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in an immigration hearing . . . ").
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humanity"' by creating a statutory privilege which guarantees
that aliens facing removal may retain counsel, though not at the
expense of the government.' Nonetheless, in 2010, just 122,465
out of 287,207 (43 percent) individuals, many of whom are indi-
gent and unable to afford an attorney, had legal representation in
front of the immigration courts. 0
For those capable of retaining lawyers, the parameters of the
statutory right to counsel have yet to be clearly delineated. Spe-
cifically, it remains unsettled whether the Constitution supports a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.
A majority of the federal appellate courts currently recognize the
validity of such a claim." Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has "repeatedly assumed without deciding that an
alien's claim of ineffective assistance may implicate due process
concerns under the Fifth Amendment."12 On the other hand, pan-
els of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have conflicted in their
approach to the question." Similarly, Fourth and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have expressly held that there is no constitu-
tional right to effective counsel in the context of removal proceed-
ings." Compounding matters further, successive United States
Attorneys General have adopted divergent views on whether such
a right exists, leaving the official Department of Justice (the "De-
partment" or "DOJ") position in a state of flux."
8. Castro-O'Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1312.
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the "INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
The statute provides that
[iun any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any appeal proceed-
ings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the person con-
cerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Govern-
ment) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.
Id.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.: ExEcUTIVE OFF. OF IMMIGR. REV., FY 2010 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, at G1, available at httpf//www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008); Zeru v. Gonzales,
503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007); Dakane v. Att'y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2003); Denko v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 351 F.3d 717, 723-24 (6th Cir. 2003); Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192,
1196 (10th Cir. 2003).
12. Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 2006).
13. Compare Castaneda-Suarez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 993 F.2d 142,
144 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing due process right), with Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523,
525 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying due process right).
14. See Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798-99 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated,
& remanded by 130 S. Ct. 350 (2009); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir.
2008).
15. See Matter of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 714-15 (B.I.A. 2009) ("Compean I"),
vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2009) ("Compean Il").
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The disagreement among, and within, the federal courts of ap-
peals on the existence of a constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in removal proceedings is significant for several
reasons. The INA precludes courts from reviewing claims arising
from decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") based
on the denial of discretionary relief and final orders of removal
against aliens convicted of designated criminal offenses." The
statute, however, creates an exception for review of constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed in
an appropriate federal appellate court." Thus, if a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel is a constitutional claim, as a majority
of the federal appellate courts have held, the courts may review
it.'" Conversely, courts in jurisdictions in which the right has not
been recognized have generally dismissed petitions for review al-
leging ineffective assistance of counsel."
This Comment will begin by briefly examining the implications
of the Supreme Court's precedent establishing that removal and
deportation proceedings are civil with regard to the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. It will then
address the substantive and procedural framework for establish-
ing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel adopted in a major-
ity of the federal judicial circuits and contrast that to the position
embraced by the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Cir-
cuits. Following a review of the principal cases, the BIA's evolving
stance on the subject will be explored. In particular, the focus will
be on the Department's proposed amendments to the regulations
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) establish-
ing procedures for handling motions to reopen immigration pro-
ceedings based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de-
veloped after Attorney General Holder's decision vacating
Compean. Finally, this Comment will consider the practical ef-
fects on the immigration process of incompetent representation-
or no representation at all-and argue that fundamental fairness
16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)-(C).
17. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
18. Munro v. Mukasey, 293 F. App'x. 804 (2d Cir. 2008). As a result, immigrants who
would generally be unable to seek judicial review because their claim involves issues of
fact, discretionary decisions, or one of the enumerated criminal convictions often attempt to
obtain review by arguing that their claim involves a constitutional claim, i.e. that they have
been denied effective assistance in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Recinos v.
Holder, 404 F. App'x 173 (9th Cir. 2010).
19. Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L.
Ed. 2d 513 (2009).
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requires the nation's highest court to finally resolve this important
issue by recognizing that aliens have a right to receive effective
counsel when facing removal from this country.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Removal Proceedings as Civil in Nature
A concise review of the historical treatment of deportation and
its antecedents, along with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
the nature of removal proceedings, is necessary to place the cur-
rent circuit split on the right to effective assistance of counsel in
context. The concept of "deportation" is a relatively recent legal
invention.2 0 However, its early ancestor, banishment, has existed
in one form or another for thousands of years, and the law rele-
vant to banishment most likely informed the early views on depor-
tation in this country.2 ' Although questions exist as to whether
the power could be exercised solely through civil means or re-
quired the use of the criminal process, there is no doubt that ban-
ishment was used primarily as a punishment for crimes in com-
mon law England.2 2 This view was exported to the United States
with the colonists, and banishment remained a valid punishment
for serious crimes well into the Nineteenth Century.2 3 Indeed the
founders never adopted any civil method for expelling noncitizens;
instead, they relied solely on the criminal penalty of banishment.2 4
The case of Chae Chan Ping 6. United States (the "Chinese Ex-
clusion Case"),2 5 decided in 1889, marked a sea change in the Su-
preme Court's approach to immigration law. The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case centered on an act of Congress that prohibited Chinese
laborers from reentering the United States, even though they had
departed the country before the act's passage and carried with
them valid reentry permits.2 6 The Court refused to even consider
the criminal constitutional rights at issue, namely the prohibition
20. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1308
(2011).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1309.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1309-10.
25. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
26. Id. at 589. The act was challenged "as being in effect an expulsion from the country
of Chinese laborers, in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the
government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of congress." Id.
491Spring 2013
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against ex post facto laws.2 7 Instead, it reasoned that the power to
exclude aliens is one of the inherent powers held by all sovereign
nations, thereby exempting it from constitutional protections ap-
plicable to criminal proceedings.28
Four years later, the Court extended that logic to the deporta-
tion context in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.29 In that case,
three Chinese citizens living in the United States challenged the
validity of the statutes under which they were arrested, detained
and eventually deported, claiming that they were subjected to
criminal penalties without due process of law.30 Rejecting the con-
stitutional challenge, the Court concluded that "[t]he power to ex-
clude aliens, and the power to expel them ... are supported by the
same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same pow-
er."30 That is, exclusion is a power inherent in the nature of sover-
eignty. Accordingly, because deportation is not a punishment for
a crime, but rather an administrative determination that an alien
is no longer fit to remain in the country, "the provisions of the con-
stitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punish-
ments, have no application."3 2 In the years since Fong Yue Ting,
the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that removal pro-
ceedings are civil, and not criminal, in nature.33
27. Markowitz, supra note 20, at 1311 n.50. Markowitz posits that although the Court
never expressly labels exclusion proceedings as civil, "its refusal to even address the crimi-
nal procedure claim is strong evidence that it conceived of exclusion as a civil proceeding."
Id.
28. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-04. As the Court explained:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative de-
partment, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident
of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude
aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.
Id.
29. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
30. Id. at 703.
31. Id. at 713.
32. Id. at 730. This holding drew a strong dissent, in which Justice Field argued that
the majority ignored the well-established distinctions between the power to exclude aliens
and the power to expel aliens who have been living in the country for long periods of time
with the government's consent without affording some constitutional protections. Id. at
756 (Field, J., dissenting). Further, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that depor-
tation is not a criminal sanction, the dissenters argued "that if a banishment of the sort
described be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult
to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied." Id. at 759.
33. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1038 (1984) (explaining that "[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to deter-
mine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry. . . ."); Mahler v.
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As a consequence of designating removal proceedings as civil ra-
ther than criminal, the Sixth Amendment's procedural protec-
tions, including the right to appointed counsel, do not apply.'
Although the Supreme Court has from time to time expressed con-
cern about the practical implications of this continuing distinc-
tion, it has not chosen to reconsider the issue and continues to
employ the civil label.3 ' Thus, the federal appellate courts have
been forced to reconcile the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to
apply the Sixth Amendment's safeguards to removal proceedings
with a desire to ensure adequate representation for those aliens
able to hire attorneys in accordance with their statutorily created
right to retain counsel. The result reached by a majority of the
federal courts of appeals, which will be explored in detail immedi-
ately below, has been described as an oddity.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (concluding that "[t]he right to expel aliens is a sovereign pow-
er, necessary to the safety of the country, and only limited by treaty obligations in respect
thereto entered into with other governments"); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
242 (1912) (holding that civil nature of removal proceedings allows for the retroactive ap-
plication of a law which invalidated fraudulently obtained naturalization certificates).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); see also Watson v. Moss, 619
F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) ("There is no constitutional or statutory right for an indigent
to have counsel appointed in a civil case. It of course follows there is no constitutional or
statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case.") (Internal citations omit-
ted).
35. See, e.g., Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)
(describing the "drastic deprivations" that follow deportation and applying criminal law's
burden of proof requirement to removal proceedings); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952) (calling rationale for civil classification "debatable" but nonetheless refus-
ing to reconsider the question); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (recognizing that
deportation "visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom" and cautioning that "care must be exercised lest
the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of
fairness").
36. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (reiterating that "removal
proceedings are civil in nature.") (Internal citations omitted). Interestingly, the Supreme
Court has continued to consider removal proceedings civil in nature even though the "in-
herent powers theory," which the Court originally employed to rationalize the civil label,
has long since been repudiated as a theory of congressional power. See Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (explaining that the United States does not have "any general
power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his as-
sent. This power cannot . .. be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed
by all nations."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality) (reasoning that "[tihe
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no
other source.").
37. Markowitz, supra note 20, at 1320 ("The oddity of a right to effective assistance,
without the corresponding right to any assistance at all, is perhaps the clearest example of
doctrinal incoherence in the courts' treatment of the nature of removal proceedings.").
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B. The Fifth Amendment Right to Fundamentally Fair Removal
Proceedings
Because of the well-settled Supreme Court precedent regarding
the civil nature of removal proceedings, the courts of appeals have
had to look beyond the Sixth Amendment to ground their decisions
upholding a right to effective assistance of counsel for aliens fac-
ing deportation. The end product of their inquiry is somewhat
counterintuitive and, in part, difficult to square with prior Su-
preme Court holdings."
To understand why that is so, it is important first to understand
the approach taken by a minority of the courts of appeals. Tradi-
tionally, in other settings where a general right to counsel is not
recognized, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to recognize
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.39 As these cases seem
to make clear, for an attorney's incompetence to constitute a con-
stitutional violation, it must be fairly attributable to the state.40
In the immigration setting, this would mean that because there is
no right to state-appointed counsel, there is no constitutional right
to effective counsel.
Curiously, only three courts of appeals have ever embraced that
logic. 41 Afanwi v. Mukasey,420ut of the Fourth Circuit, is perhaps
38. See Patrick J. Glen, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 1-2 (2008).
39. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (habeas proceedings); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (habeas proceedings); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586,
587-88 (1982) (per curiam) (discretionary state reviews). Justice Marshall dissented in
Wainright, arguing that "[a]lthough respondent's Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel may not have been infringed, he was denied his right to due process ....
To deny the right to seek discretionary review simply because of counsel's error is funda-
mentally unfair." Wainwright, 455 U.S. at 589 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Mar-
shall's Wainright dissent has been adopted "by many courts of appeals in the immigration
context." Glen, supra note 38, at 3.
40. See Glen, supra note 38, at 4.
41. See, e.g., Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2008); Ghaffar v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2008); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008). As
noted above, different panels of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have issued conflict-
ing decisions on whether a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel exists. See supra, note
13 and 15 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also at
times assumed that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel exists. See Sene v. U.S.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming BIA's decision
denying motion to reopen deportation proceedings because petitioner failed to comply with
BIA's procedural requirements for bringing claim for ineffective counsel). Further, in
Obleshchenko, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed "serious doubts ...
that a fifth amendment right to counsel exists" but nonetheless assumed that it did because
other courts had so held and the government did not make a counter argument. 392 F.3d
970, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2004). Since Obleshchenko, however, the Eighth Circuit has "squarely
reject[ed] an absolute constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel" in removal
cases. Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 866 (8th Cir. 2006).
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the most thorough and well-reasoned decision in which a court has
done so. In Afanwi, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals began by
conceding that a number of its sister courts have held that an at-
torney can be so inept as to deprive an alien of his Fifth Amend-
ment right to a fair hearing.4 3 However, emphasizing that the
Fifth Amendment applies only to action by the government, the
court explained there must be state action in order to imbue the
ineffectiveness of the alien's counsel to the federal government.'
Because a private actor who performs a public function is not au-
tomatically engaged in state action,4 5 the court held that
Afanwi's counsel was not a state actor, nor is there a suffi-
cient nexus between the federal government and counsel's in-
effectiveness such that the latter may fairly be treated as a
governmental action. To the contrary, Afanwi's counsel was
privately retained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1362, and his al-
leged ineffectiveness-namely his failure to check his mailbox
regularly and to file a timely appeal-was a purely private
act.46
Despite the seeming inconsistency with Supreme Court prece-
dent, a majority of the courts of appeals have found a way to ex-
tend the guarantee of effective representation to removal proceed-
ings. Their rationale has been firmly rooted in traditional notions
of due process.4 7 Specifically, it is well settled that immigrants
facing removal are entitled to due process.48 So, too, is the opinion
that removal proceedings are somehow different from everyday
civil cases, primarily because an alien's life is effectively on the
line. As a result, in the view of these courts, the traditional rule
42. 526 F.3d at 788.
43. Id. at 797-98.
44. Id. at 798. According to the court,
tihe standard for finding federal government action under the Fifth Amendment is
the same as that for finding state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, namely
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the [federal government] and the
challenged action of the [private actor] so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the [federal government].
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 799.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Paul v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 521 F.2d 194, 197-98
(5th Cir. 1975).
48. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)) ("It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to
due process of law in deportation proceedings.").
495
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enunciated in cases such as Torna and followed in Afanwi is not
clearly applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
arising from removal proceedings."9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first court
to apply that logic in Paul v. United States Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, a case in which nine Haitian nationals sought
to reopen a removal proceeding so they could further develop their
case, alleging that their privately retained attorneys made several
costly blunders." Smartly, the petitioners in Paul did not argue
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to their cases,
but instead contended that their representation was so lacking as
to violate the due process clause's requirement of fundamental
fairness." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed.52 It
explained, however, that "[a] claim of the denial of due process
because of ineffective assistance of counsel must allege sufficient
facts to allow this court to infer that competent counsel would
have acted otherwise."
Eleven years later, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
tweaked the Paul standard slightly in Magallanes-Damian v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service.54 That case involved seven
Mexican nationals who were deported for entering the United
States without inspection. 5  They sought to reopen their deporta-
tion proceedings, contending that bad advice from counsel caused
them to concede their deportability when they otherwise should
not have." The court acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment
encompasses a right to counsel, but, citing Paul, it explained that
proof of a violation requires a "heavier burden of proof. Petition-
ers must show not merely ineffective assistance of counsel, but
assistance which is so ineffective as to have impinged upon the
fundamental fairness of the hearing in violation of the [F]ifth
49. See Glen, supra note 38, at 6.
50. Paul, 521 F.2d at 197-98.
51. Id. at 198.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 199. According to the court, the petitioners failed to meet that standard. Id.
54. 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
previously acted under the assumption that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is
cognizable in immigration cases, it did not set forth the standard for assessing such claims
until Magallanes-Damian. See generally, Thorsteinsson v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 724 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing claim but denying that attorney's conduct
amounted to constitutional violation), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Rodriguez-
Gonzalez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 640 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1981) (same).
55. Id. at 932.
56. Id. at 932-33.
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[A]mendment due process clause."17 In other words, absent egre-
gious circumstances, "[p]etitioners are generally bound by the
conduct of their attorneys, including admissions made by them."
Since Paul and Magallanes-Damian, the federal appellate
courts that recognize a right to effective counsel in immigration
cases have all employed the Fifth Amendment's fundamental fair-
ness standard. However, minor variations exist as to the applica-
tion of this standard. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has held that petitioners must show only "a reasona-
ble probability of prejudice" in order to prevail on claims of ineffec-
tive counsel." Both the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals employ a familiar two-part test, under which an alien must
prove that (1) competent counsel would have acted differently and
(2) the alien was prejudiced.60 To that test, the Third Circuit adds
that the prejudice suffered must be substantial, i.e., there must be
a "significant likelihood" that the immigration judge would have
ruled differently absent the attorney's ineffectiveness." Minor
distinctions in language notwithstanding, the standard is applied
fairly consistently throughout the federal judicial circuits and, as
one commentator has put it, "functions similarly to the facially
lower standard of reasonable performance required under the
Sixth Amendment."6 2
C. BIA's Evolving Stance on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims
1. BIA's Historical Approach
Like the majority of federal appellate courts, the BIA has recog-
nized a right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceed-
ings for more than twenty years. Prior to Compean I, the leading
57. Id. at 933 (citing Paul, 521 F.2d at 198).
58. Id. at 934 (internal citations omitted).
59. Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007).
60. United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2003); Contreras v. Att'y Gen. of
the U.S., 665 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir. 2012).
61. Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584-85.
62. Markovitz, supra note 20, at 1320 (compiling cases applying highly deferential
standard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment) (inter-
nal citations omitted). Courts have consistently found ineffective assistance of counsel in a
number of scenarios, such as failing to contact an alien client or to inform her of hearing
dates, failing to attend a removal hearing, failing to argue certain issues or raise certain
defenses, or failing to appeal an unfavorable decision. See generally, Emmanuel S. Tipon,
Annotation, Comment Note: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings-
Particular Omissions or Failures, 60 A.L.R. FED. 2d 59 (2011).
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administrative case on ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
immigration cases was Matter of Lozada," which established the
procedural framework for bringing such claims. In Lozada, a law-
ful permanent resident was found deportable after being convicted
of a crime of moral turpitude.6 4 He appealed the immigration
judge's decision to the BIA and gave notice that he would file a
written brief to support his appeal." However, his attorney never
filed any such brief, and his appeal was summarily dismissed.6 6
After obtaining new counsel, Lozada sought to reopen his proceed-
ings, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in that his first at-
torney negligently failed to submit the required brief."
Citing Paul and Magallanes-Damian, the BIA first acknowl-
edged that the Fifth Amendment may afford aliens a right to
counsel in deportation proceedings if the proceedings are funda-
mentally unfair." The second part of the Board's holding ad-
dressed the procedural requirements for reopening removal pro-
ceedings based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Un-
der what have come be called the "Lozada requirements," a re-
moval proceeding will be reopened only if a party (1) submits an
affidavit attesting to the relevant facts, such as the nature of at-
torney-client agreement; (2) notifies former counsel of the allega-
tions of ineffective assistance and allows for an opportunity to re-
spond; and (3) files a complaint with the proper disciplinary au-
thorities or at least explains why no such -complaint was filed,
when the allegations involve ethical or legal lapses."
Fifteen years later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") sought a reversal of Lozada, arguing that it conflicted with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Wainwright v. Torna" and
Coleman v. Thompson,n but the BIA declined.7 2 While acknowl-
63. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 638
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 639; see also Patrick J. Glen, The Death Knell for Constitutional Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims in Immigration Proceedings, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid= 1409409 (last visited June 12, 2012)
("Since Lozada, these requirements have been broadly adopted in the federal courts of
appeals, along with the notion that aliens enjoy a constitutional due process right to the
effective assistance of counsel.").
70. 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam).
71. 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that where there is no right to appointed counsel,
there is concomitantly no right to effective assistance of counsel).
72. In re Bassel Nabih Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 554 (B.I.A. 2003).
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edging the existence of seemingly inconsistent Supreme Court
precedent and "some ambiguity in the basis set forth in [Lozada]
for respondents to assert ineffective assistance claims," the BIA
determined that it was bound by the weight of decisions from the
courts of appeals recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel as
violative of due process." Holding otherwise, the Board explained,
would amount to a pronouncement that the majority of the courts
of appeals had reached the wrong result-an act that would have
exceeded the BIA's authority.74
Notwithstanding the INS's effort to overturn Lozada, the feder-
al courts that recognize a right to effective counsel have embraced
the Lozada requirements, finding them necessary to "screen out
frivolous, stale, and collusive claims."" However, these courts
have applied the Lozada with varying degrees of rigor. Some
courts have required "strict compliance."" In other jurisdictions,
"substantial compliance" with Lozada is sufficient.77
2. Matter of Compean and the Pullback from Lozada
In the past four years, the BIA's legal standards regarding
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been in a state of
change. The change began on August 7, 2008, when, in the final
weeks of the Bush Administration, then-Attorney General Robert
Mukasey directed the BIA to refer to him three cases for review,
each of which involved an attempt to reopen removal proceedings
on the basis of incompetent representation. The question the
Attorney General wished to consider was simple: "whether the
Constitution entitles an alien who has been harmed by his law-
yer's deficient performance in removal proceedings to redo those
proceedings.""
73. Id. at 558-60. Notably, the BIA pointed out that most of those appellate court deci-
sions were handed down after Coleman in 1991, which "suggests that the courts of appeals
have not viewed the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the criminal context as requiring
a reexamination of the due process underpinnings of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
in the immigration context." Id. at 559.
74. Id. at 560.
75. Beltre-Veloz v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
76. See, e.g., Rong v. Holder, 367 F. App'x. 579, 538 (6th Cir. 2010).
77. See, e.g., Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2010); Morales Apolinar
v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2008); Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 863 (8th
Cir. 2006).
78. Compean 1, 24 1. &N. Dec. 710, 712 (B.I.A. 2009).
79. Id.
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The Attorney General concluded that it did not,"o upending the
weight of authority from the courts of appeals and twenty-five
years of the BIA's own precedents, including Lozada. Critical to
the Attorney General's decision was the line of Supreme Court
cases holding that there is no constitutional right to effective as-
sistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment where there is no
constitutional right to counsel to begin with, as is the case in most
civil proceedings." While the Attorney General acknowledged
that this view conflicted with the opinion taken by a majority of
the courts of appeals, he noted that "a growing number of Federal
courts" had started to embrace it.82 He further noted that the ear-
ly decision in Paul v. United States Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, had been largely misconstrued and, as a result, the
majority position "rest[s] on a weak foundation."" Therefore, the
Attorney General held that the government could not be held re-
sponsible for the ineffectiveness of a privately retained attorney,
and the Fifth Amendment could not provide the basis for an inef-
fective counsel claim.
Despite so holding, the Attorney General conceded that in rare
circumstances, the BIA may choose to reopen removal proceedings
on account of an attorney's incompetence, because the DOJ's dis-
cretion is not limited by the Constitution." To aid the BIA and
the immigration courts, he then established a new framework for
reopening removal proceedings for deficient representation, while
acknowledging that the immigration judge and BIA should be left
with considerable discretion in this area.8 6 Attorney General
Mukasey's "deficient performance of counsel" test contained three
elements, which were similar but not identical to the Lozada re-
quirements. First, the alien must demonstrate an egregious mis-
take on the part of his or her lawyer." Second, if the alien at-
tempts to reopen his or her case after the 90-day time limit, the
80. Id. at 714.
81. Id. at 714. Thus, under this logic, it follows that
although the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies in removal proceedings,
as it does in any civil lawsuit or in any administrative proceeding, that Clause does
not entitle an alien to effective assistance of counsel, much less the specific remedy of
a second bite at the apple based on the mistakes of his own lawyer.
Id.
82. Id. at 713-15.
83. Id. at 719.
84. Id. at 720-21.
85. Id. at 714.
86. Id. at 730.
87. Id. at 732.
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BIA may toll the period only if the alien shows that he or she ex-
ercised due diligence." Third, the alien must show that he or she
was prejudiced by the attorney's error." With respect to the third
element, Attorney General Mukasey attempted to settle the confu-
sion by reigning in the federal circuits on the meaning of prejudice
and instructing that an alien must show that it is more likely than
not that he or she would have obtained the desired relief were it
not for the attorney's missteps.o
3. Attorney General Holder Vacates Matter of Compean
Attorney General Mukasey's decision in Compean I was less
than one year old when, on June 3, 2009, President Obama's new-
ly appointed Attorney General, Eric Holder, vacated the decision
and directed the BIA and immigration judges to again apply the
Lozada requirements until new rules could be formulated." Ac-
cording to Attorney General Holder, Compean I was brashly de-
cided, "particularly for a decision that implemented a new, com-
plex framework in place of a well-established and longstanding
practice that had been reaffirmed by the Board in 2003 after care-
ful consideration."9 2 Not only that, the decision in Compean I also
overreached by definitely deciding that the Constitution affords no
right to effective counsel for aliens facing removal from the United
States.9 3 Instead of taking a top-down approach and merely dic-
tating a new standard to the to the BIA and the courts, Attorney
General Holder explained that it would be preferable to establish
a process that gave all interested a parties a seat at the table.94
In view of that, the Attorney General directed the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review to evaluate the Lozada requirements
and decide whether modifications should be made." A period of
public comment, which has just concluded, was scheduled to fol-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 733.
90. Id. at 733-34. The Attorney General also held that certain documents must be
attached to a claim in order to succeed on a claim to reopen removal proceedings based on
bad lawyering. Id. at 735-39.
91. Compean 1, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 2009) (decided by the Attorney General).
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
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low." After soliciting comments, the DOJ could establish a defini-
tive framework for going forward."
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Removal
Proceedings is Solidly Grounded in the Constitution
1. Effective Representation has Historically Been Viewed as
a Component of Due Process
Several scholars, judges, and attorneys have criticized the ap-
proach adopted by the majority of the federal appellate courts,
arguing that their recognition of a right to effective assistance of
counsel in removal proceedings has no basis in the Constitution."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to call the
majority's reasoning "distinctly perfunctory."" According to this
view, the court in Paul did not actually hold that a right to effec-
tive representation existed. Instead, it simply indicated "in dic-
tum that any right an alien may have in this regard is grounded in
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process rather than the
sixth amendment right to counsel.""'0 This argument, however,
ignores the federal judiciary's historical approach to addressing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the string of Su-
preme Court decisions affording a right to counsel in civil proceed-
ings.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmento pro-
vides individuals with both substantive and procedural rights.102
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[bly requiring the govern-
ment to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, the Due Process
Clause promotes fairness in such decisions." 03 That fairness is
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710; Glen, supra note 38, at 3.
99. Stroe v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 256 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir" 2001).
100. Compean 1, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 719-20 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
omitted).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
102. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (plurality).
103. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).
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secured by affording an individual with notice and opportunity to
be heard by a competent tribunal.o4
For years, the right to effective counsel was grounded in the
Fifth Amendment's requirement of due process, considering it an
essential component of a defendant's right to be heard."o' Indeed,
in a number of early cases, the Fifth Amendment was seen as an
independent source of the guarantee of effective representation,
apart from the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision. For
example, in Powell v. Alabama, not only did the Supreme Court
hold that the government may have a duty to appoint counsel in
certain cases, but it also recognized that the failure of appointed
counsel to provide "effective aide in the preparation and trial of
the case" could deny a capital defendant due process of law.'o
Likewise, in another early seminal case, Diggs v. Welch, the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
explained that "[ciarelessness of counsel" may be "one of the evi-
dentiary facts which, coupled with others, show a violation of the
Fifth Amendment."' 7 There is thus strong precedent for analyz-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel claims against the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment.
Furthermore, the fact that the Supreme Court has extended the
right to counsel to certain "hybrid" or "quasi-criminal" civil pro-
ceedings, much like removal proceedings, undercuts the view that
the Due Process Clause does not provide an independent source of
the right to effective representation. In In re Gault, the Supreme
Court first held that the right to counsel may extend to unique
civil proceedings."0 s That case involved a juvenile delinquency
hearing, after which a teenager was civilly committed in a state
industrial school.' Because juvenile delinquency proceedings are
104. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898) (explaining that "there are cer-
tain immutable principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea of free government,
which no member of the Union may disregard, as that no man shall be condemned in his
person or property without due notice, and an opportunity of being heard in his defense.").
105. See James A. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New
Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 449 (1977).
106. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
107. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The landmark case of Gideon v.
Wainwright, in which the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment's require-
ment of court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants against the states, marked a
change in the way courts handled claims of ineffective representation. 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963). In the wake of Gideon, courts began to test ineffectiveness claims against the Sixth
Amendment instead of the Due Process Clause. See Strazzella, supra note 105, at 450. At
the same time, they lost sight of the historical underpinnings of such claims.
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
109. Id. at 4.
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civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
apply.1 o Nevertheless, the Court held that based on the special
nature of delinquency proceedings, due process required that ju-
veniles in such proceedings be afforded the right to effective coun-
sel.111
Similarly, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to
parole revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, despite their
civil character.112 Acknowledging that parole revocation hearings
are considered "civil" proceedings and are different from criminal
trials, the Court nonetheless concluded that the special nature of
certain parole revocation cases might make the presence of
trained counsel essential.'13 As the Court explained, "the un-
skilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have diffi-
culty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the
presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of wit-
nesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evi-
dence."114 Moreover, although parole hearings are generally not
adversarial in nature, they can become so when a parole officer
recommends revocation "'-a recommendation that, like deporta-
tion, threatens to turn a parolee's life upside down. Accordingly,
the Court held that there are instances "in which fundamental
fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the
State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or
parolees."11
These cases demonstrate that, not only was the right to effective
assistance of counsel historically rooted in the Due Process
Clause, but also that the assistance of counsel may still be an es-
sential component of due process, even in civil proceedings. Thus,
although the federal appellate courts that have recognized a right
to effective representation may not have explicitly addressed the
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to counsel in this
context, their view is nonetheless firmly rooted in the Constitu-
tion.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id. at 41. "The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of
law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Id. at 36.
112. 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973).
113. Id. at 787.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 785.
116. Id. at 790.
504 Vol. 51
Spring 2013 "Drastic Sanction" 505
2. The "State Actor" Argument is Misguided
There is not only ample support in the Constitution and Su-
preme Court precedent for recognizing a right to effective assis-
tance of counsel in removal proceedings, but the argument ad-
vanced by those courts that have refused to recognize such a right
is suspect. In Afanwi, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that because a privately retained attorney was not a state
actor under the Due Process Clause, an alien facing removal can-
not be denied her Fifth Amendment right to a fair hearing when
her attorney commits a grievous error."' The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has expressed a similar view."' This argument,
however, is largely without merit because the government's con-
duct of removal proceedings is itself sufficient to constitute state
action for purposes of Due Process.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the missteps of retained counsel at a criminal trial could not
give rise to federal habeas corpus relief, because there was a lack
of state action."' In other words, according to the Court, the Sixth
Amendment protects not only against incompetent state-
appointed attorneys, but also against the incompetence of private-
ly retained attorneys. Specifically, the Court explained that
"[w]hen a State obtains a criminal conviction through [a trial
tainted by ineffective counsel], it is the State that unconstitution-
ally deprives the defendant of his liberty."120 In fact, "the State's
conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the de-
fendant's conviction."121
Admittedly, Cuyler involved a challenge to the conduct of a pri-
vately retained attorney at a criminal trial. Nevertheless, in
many cases, deportation proceedings are merely an extension of
the criminal process. In addition, they involve many of the same
procedural elements as traditional trials. As a result, the State is
just as much implicated in such proceedings as in criminal prose-
cutions. The State established an elaborate appeals process
through which immigrants may challenge the charges leveled
against them. 2 2 It fashioned the rules governing the right to seek
117. Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 799 (4th Cir. 2008).
118. See Raflyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008).
119. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).
120. Id. at 343.
121. Id. at 344-45.
122. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 18 (1956)).
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review of the initial decisions of the immigration judges. Finally,
its deportation orders are the final word, with the power to remove
immigrants from this country for the rest of their lives. Under
these circumstances, the state-actor requirement is clearly satis-
fied, just as it was in Cuyler.
B. Practical Considerations Support Recognizing a Right to
Effective Counsel in Removal Proceedings
Not only is there a strong Constitutional basis for recognizing
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause encompasses a
right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, but
there are also several practical considerations that weigh in favor
of affording added procedural protections to immigrants facing
deportation. A number of these considerations were alluded to in
Section I, and they will be explored in greater detail in this Sec-
tion.
This country's legal tradition has placed a strong emphasis on
securing the rights of the most vulnerable among us,'23 and few
segments of society today are as disadvantaged as the foreign
born.'24 According to the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, im-
migrants have a higher unemployment rate and earned more than
$170 per week less than their native-born counterparts.125 Not
only are there socioeconomic forces at play, they are also far less
educated.126 In addition, the heated debate over the nation's im-
migration policy and harsh crackdown by some states on their
immigrant populations illustrates that nativist sentiments have
also been on the rise, which has led to increased anxiety and fear
123. See, e.g., ."); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) ("We
conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other
tax."); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded
as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.").
124. See Roberto Suro, Jill H. Wilson, & Audrey Singer, Immigration and Poverty
in America's Suburbs, BROOKINGS INST. 5 (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2011/8/04%20immigration%20suro
%2 0wilson%20singer/0804_immigration suro wilson singer.pdf (explaining that nation-
wide, the foreign-born population had a higher poverty rate (17.5%) than the native born
(13.9%) in 2009).
125. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-
BORN WORKERS SUMMARY (May 24, 2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm.
126. See Suro et al., supra note 124, at 1.
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of government in the foreign-born population. 127 Accordingly, as
Circuit Judge Katzmann of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained, removal proceedings typically involve "a vulnerable
population of human beings who come to this country in the hopes
of a better life, who enter often without knowing the English lan-
guage and culture, in economic deprivation, often in fear."128 The-
se factors alone are sufficient to warrant providing greater proce-
dural safeguards to aliens in removal proceedings.
Moreover, removal proceedings are fundamentally unlike any
other type of civil proceeding. Some scholars have suggested that
in reality they "straddle the divide" between criminal and civil
proceedings. 129 For example, a growing body of research indicates
that the norms of the "criminal enforcement model," i.e. the "theo-
ries, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforce-
ment," have largely been incorporated into removal proceedings. 0
On a more basic level, the hearings themselves have come to look
and feel like criminal proceedings. Local law enforcement officers
are often involved in immigration enforcement and called to testi-
fy at hearings before immigration judges.' 3 1 Those hearings follow
the filing of a notice to appear outlining the alleged charges, which
the alien or his or her attorney must contest orally or in writing.'
At one counsel table is the alien, and at the other is an attorney
representing the government and prosecuting the charges.' 3 In
sum, removal proceedings have all of the trappings of a traditional
criminal hearing.
Of course, an unfavorable decision by an immigration judge, just
like that of a criminal judge, also triggers enormous repercussions
to the party involved that vastly differ from those associated with
traditional civil proceedings. While the typical civil suit might
result in a large damages award, the stakes in immigration pro-
127. See Uriel J. Garcia, Opponents Say Alabama's "Juan Crow" Law Causes Fear, Anxi-
ety, TUcSON SENTINEL (Nov. 24, 2011), httpiwww.tucsonsentinel.com/ lo-
cal/report/112411_alaimmigration_1aw/opponents-say-alas-juan-crow-law-causes-fear-
anxiety/.
128. Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant
Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008).
129. See Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling The Civil-Criminal Divide, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 289 (2008).
130. Id. at 472.
131. Markowitz, supra note 20, at 1315.
132. See Immigration Court Practice Manual, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW 68-70, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Chap%204.pdf (last visited
Dec. 15, 2004). .
133. Id. at 56.
507Spring 2013
Duquesne Law Review
ceedings are far greater. As the Supreme Court has recently ob-
served, deportation is now virtually "an automatic result for a
broad class of noncitizen offenders."' 3 4 And for that class of indi-
viduals, deportation is in essence a life sentence-permanent ban-
ishment from the home, family, and country that they spent years
building. Worse yet, these individuals can be deported to places
they have not been in years, countries where they have no connec-
tions, where they might struggle with the language, and where
they can face persecution, imprisonment, or even death.'3 5  Fur-
thermore, many of the countries to which American immigrants
are deported are ridden with internal conflict and strife, which
only compounds things further."
Not only are the stakes of removal proceedings high, but they
can also be far disproportionate to the conduct that initially
brought the alien into the legal system. Title 8 U.S.C §
1227(a)(2)(A) provides for the deportation of individuals convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Although "moral turpitude"
may sound like a demanding description, reserved for only the
most egregious of offenses, in operation it is anything but. Immi-
grants can be deported for even the most minor of offenses, includ-
ing petty theft and neglecting to pay a subway fare. 3 1 In fact,
more than 18 percent of the criminal aliens removed from the
United States in 2010 were merely involved in routine traffic
stops.1" Though many of those individuals were eventually con-
134. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010)
135. Markowitz, supra note 20, at 1301-02; Werlin, supra note 3, at 405.
136. For example, according to the Department of Homeland Security, Mexican nation-
als account for the vast majority of all aliens removed from the United States. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010 4 (2011). Mexico has been in
the throes of a violent drug war for much of the last decade, with hundreds being murdered
each month. See Afred Corchado, Mexico's Drug War Undiminished in Some Areas Close to
Texas, Authorities Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.dallasnews.com
(noting that 1,000 persons have been murdered across Mexico since December 1, 2012).
137. See Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that petty
theft is categorically a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of immigration laws); Mojica v.
Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that "a legal permanent resident
convicted of . .. two misdemeanor petty theft or public transportation fare evasion charges
- turnstile jumping in the New York City subway system leading to a "theft of services"
misdemeanor conviction is considered a crime of 'moral turpitude' - is now subject to auto-
matic deportation without any opportunity to present to an Immigration Judge any miti-
gating equities").
138. See IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 136, at 4.
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victed of drunk driving, 13,028 were convicted and deported for
less serious traffic law violations.13 1
The complexity of immigration law, when added to this already
unfortunate mix-a poor, vulnerable population swept up in pro-
ceedings with all of the trappings and stakes of criminal proceed-
ings with few, if any, of the Constitutional protections-makes
things far worse for the immigrant population. Immigration law
is a tangled maze of statutes and administrative rules.140 The
grounds for deportation, for example, are broken down into six
broad categories, each of which contains a dizzying array of parts,
sub-parts, elements, exceptions and waivers.'41 Even a trained
immigration attorney needs to consult the INA's extensive defini-
tion section to make any sense of this labyrinthine structure.'42
Not surprisingly, research indicates that immigrants have a
greater chance of success before an immigration judge when they
have counsel present.'43 Anecdotal evidence from appellate judges
supports that research. Based on his experiences on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, Judge Katzmann has ar-
gued that it is absolutely critical to obtain counsel as early in the
proceedings as possible.1" "What is filed and what is said have
enduring effects," he has written.145 "Often times, the reviewing
appellate judge, who is constrained at the time the case comes be-
fore him or her, is left with the feeling that if only the immigrant
had secured adequate representation at the outset, the outcome
might have been different." 4 6
139. Deportations of Immigrants Hits Record Number Under Obama Administration,
HUFFINGTONPOST (July 22, 2011), httpJ/www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/22/deportations-
obama-immigration-n_906676.html.
140. See, e.g., Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d
1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing complexities of immigration law).
141. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 267, 8 U.S.C §1227 (2006); see also
Werlin, supra note 3, at 414-15.
142. Werlin, supra note 3, at 415. As just one example, Werlin explains that the INA
employs the word "conviction" in setting forth the grounds for deportation. Id. Its use of
the term, however, has a far broader meaning than is typically associated with the term.
Id.
143. Katzmann, supra note 128, at 4 (discussing in the context of immigrants seeking
asylum). According to Judge Katzmann, "quality legal representation in gathering and
presenting evidence in a hearing context and the skill in advocacy as to any legal issues
and their preservation for appeal can make all the difference between the right to remain
here and being deported." Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id. at 9.
146. Id.
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At the same time, the effects of ineffective representation can be
just as devastating. Unfortunately, evidence of attorneys offering
inadequate and incompetent legal services to immigrants
abounds. As members of such a vulnerable population, they are
the perfect prey for unscrupulous elements of the legal profession.
Indeed, because of their limited experience with the legal system,
lack of means, and limited grasp of English, many immigrants
struggle to find competent counsel, turning instead to travel
agents or unlicensed notarios for advice.'47 Judge Katzmann has
observed that the quality of representation in removal proceedings
"varies widely."'48 A number of the filings on immigration appeals
that reach his chambers "are barely competent, often boilerplate
submissions."14 One New York City immigration attorney has
been referred to the Second Circuit's disciplinary board more than
six times for copying old briefs and resubmitting them to the court
without editing them to account for the distinct facts of each new
case.' Further, the effects of bad lawyering reverberate through
all facets of the removal process, as the failure to take necessary
steps in the lead-up to a hearing with an immigration judge can
make all the difference in an appeal.'
This combination of factors makes it imperative to guarantee
immigrants a Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel in removal proceedings. Navigating the maze of immigra-
tion laws is difficult for anyone-let alone those with a limited
grasp of English, whose lives in this country are on the line. In
those relatively rare cases where immigrants facing deportation
are able to obtain counsel before their removal proceedings, they
come to rely on the advice they receive, even more so than the typ-
ical litigant because of language barrier, the sense of uncertainty
surrounding their futures, and the confusion about the complex
proceedings in which they have been swept up. They come to
trust that the person they have hired to represent their interests
147. Id. at 8. According to Judge Kazmann, "[tihese unauthorized practitioners, some-
times known, misleadingly as "notarios", charge immigrants for their services in filing
documents and preparing applicants for relief and benefits, but often lead the immigrants
astray with incorrect information and terrible advice with lasting, damaging consequenc-
es. . . ." Id.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id.; see also Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 596 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that [wlith
disturbing frequency, this Court encounters evidence of ineffective representation by attor-
neys retained by immigrants seeking legal status in this country").
150. Adam Liptak, The Verge of Expulsion, The Fringe of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 15,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/us/15bar.html.
151. See Katzmann, supra note 128, at 9.
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will know what is best for them and their families. Accordingly,
when an immigrant hires an attorney who turns out to be incom-
petent, she must be afforded the Constitutional right to reopen the
proceedings. Otherwise, as Judge Katzmann has observed,
"[ulnlike a person in the United States who can sue a lawyer for
malpractice, or file a bar complaint, a deported immigrant is un-
likely to pursue such recourse because of financial, geographic or
other constraints," will be left with virtually no recourse when her
counsel errs.'52 The Constitution, and this Country's commitment
to looking after the most downtrodden among us, demands more.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of federal courts of appeals are correct in recogniz-
ing that due process requires that noncitizens be given an oppor-
tunity to reopen removal proceedings when their attorneys render
incompetent assistance. First, despite the contention of the mi-
nority of the federal appellate courts and a number of commenta-
tors, the Constitution- and well-reasoned Supreme Court prece-
dent-supports this view. As that precedent has established, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may at times operate
as an independent source for asserting violations of rights stem-
ming from an attorney's conduct. Second, the state actor argu-
ment advanced by opponents of recognizing a right to effective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings does not categorically
foreclose the recognition of such a right, as state action has been
found in analogous types of proceedings in the past.
In addition, removal proceedings are fundamentally unlike any
other type of civil proceeding. In many ways, they have come to
mirror criminal trials. And, as the Supreme Court recently ex-
plained, even though deportation is technically regarded as civil in
nature, it "is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal pro-
cess. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty
of deportation for nearly a century."5 ' Indeed, it is virtually im-
possible "to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deporta-
tion context."154 Not only do removal proceedings blur the tradi-
tional distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings, but
they also have devastating consequences for a historically helpless
group of people. Families and lives can be destroyed. Unfortu-
152. Id. at 9.
153. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
154. Id.
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nately, individuals facing removal are also quite vulnerable to un-
scrupulous people and are unlikely to seek redress through mal-
practice actions or the like when something goes wrong.
There must therefore be some form of constitutionally guaran-
teed recourse when an attorney's conduct falls below the profes-
sional standards and prevents a noncitizen from effectively pre-
senting his or her case. Attorney General Holder's decision vacat-
ing Matter of Compean and instituting proceedings for drafting
regulations governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is a
step in the right direction. The results of the rulemaking process
are as yet unknown, but hopefully the new regulations will over-
come the perceived deficiencies of the Lozada requirements,"' and
establish a workable, lasting framework for addressing these
claims. "'
It is not enough, however, that the Department of Justice rec-
ognizes the validity of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As evidenced by Attorney General Mukasey's decision in Matter of
Compean, the federal government can merely eliminate all availa-
ble remedies with a single decision at will. Instead, the Supreme
Court should intervene and address the constitutional issues, fi-
nally resolving the split among the federal courts of appeals. If it
chooses to do so, it will have sufficient legal, moral and practical
bases for recognizing what a majority of the federal appellate
courts have recognized for more than thirty years-namely, that
the Constitution firmly secures an immigrant's right to reopen her
removal proceedings when her attorney commits a costly error.
155. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
156. See Letter from American Immigration Council, to Thomas G. Snow, Director, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (Nov. 12, 2009), available at
http:/ /www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/IAC-EOIRletter-2009-11-
12.pdf (outlining perceived problems with the Lozada requirements).
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